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INSURANCE
WZSL Y M. WAIM*
Fraudulent Breachof Contracts A ccompanied by a Fraudulent Act
During the period of this survey, there were seven cases decided
by the Supreme Court involving actions for the recovery of both
actual and punitive damages resulting from the breach of insurance
contracts accompanied by a fraudulent act. In actions of this nature
a major problem has been the determination of what constitutes a
fraudulent act. These seven cases, however, clearly define one such
act, i. e., the refusal of the company to collect premiums with thd
intention of cancelling out policies.1  Other than this, these seven
cases have little in common and will be separately reviewed.
Hutcherson v. Pilgrim Health & Life Insurance Company2 was
defended on the grounds that the payments on the premium were
four weeks in arrears and that, by its terms, the policy had lapsed.
The trial court was affirmed in holding that whether or not the in-
surer's departure from its established custom of collecting premiums
at insured's home resulted in waiver of this provision presented
issue for the jury. The insurer further contended that its offer in
its answer to remit any premiums now due or in arrears and to re-
instate the policy eliminated any damage the plaintiff might have
suffered by reason of the cancellation. The trial judge was held
to be correct in submitting this issue to the jury.
Davis v. Bankers Life and Casualty Company3 held that an action
could be maintained for punitive in addition to actual damages where
the insurer had sent a notice to the insured stating that his policy
had lapsed, when in fact the premium had been paid, notwithstand-
ing the insurer's contention that the notice had been sent in error and
had no effect on the validity of the policy. In addition to this hold-
ing, this case is important in that it reiterates the courses an insured
may pursue where his insurer wrongfully cancels, repudiates, or
terminates the contract of insurance, viz: 1 -He may elect to
treat the policy as still in force, and let the test of the validity of
the cancellation or repudiation await until the policy is payable and
is sued upon; 2 -He may sue in equity to set aside the cancellation,
OMember of firm of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville, S. C.
1. Harris v. United Insurance Company, 227 S.C. 593, 88 S.E. 2d 672 (1955).
2. 227 S.C. 239, 87 S.E. 2d 685 (1955).
3. 227 S.C. 587, 88 S.E. 2d 658 (1955).
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and to have the policy declared to be valid and in force; or 3-He
may maintain an action at law to recover damages for the wrongful
cancellation or repudiation.
Harris v. United Insurance Company4 held that the trial Judge
was correct in directing a verdict for the defendant as to punitive
damages where there was no showing that the breach was accom-
panied by a fraudulent act. The Supreme Court held there was no
showing of illiteracy or over-reaching, and there was no evidence
from which it might be reasonably concluded that the company re-
fus d to collect the preniuns with the intention of cancelling out
the policies. This case also held that the trial Judge was correct in
overruling the defendant's motion for a directed verdict as to actual
damages where the policy provided that the insured would be notified
in writing if the insurer decided to discontinue collection of premi-
ums at insured's home and where the insured had been informed of
the company's position on the date of the last premium payment but
such was not done in writing as required under the policy.
Patterson v. Capital Health Insurance Company5 held that the
complaint stated no facts entitling plaintiff to recover punitive dam-
ages and that, therefore, the trial court was correct in granting de-
fendant's motion to strike from the complaint all allegations pertain-
ing to the recovery of punitive damages.
Goodman v. George Washington Life Insurance Co.6 held the
evidence to be insufficient to sustain verdict for insured in action for
alleged fraud and deceit where the insured testified that defendant's
agent had said the policy would be in full force and effect after
fifteen days, and the policy actually required six months waiting
period before any benefits for surgery would be applicable. Plain-
tiff was not damaged as a result of this misunderstanding because
his operation came more than six months after the policy was issued.
Blackman v. The Independent Life and Accident Insurance Com-
pany7 was an action by the beneficiary of a life insurance policy
who sought both actual and punitive damages for the alleged breach
of the insurance contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. The
complaint alleged that the policy was in full force at the time of the
insured's death, but that the insurer refused to pay the plaintiff the
amount due and that insurer represented that the policy was no good
4. 227 S.C. 593, 88 S.E. 2d 672 (1955).
5. 228 S.C. 297, 89 S.E. 2d 723 (1955).
6. 228 S.C. 306, 89 S.E. 2d 753 (1955).
7. 229 S.C. 54, 91 S.E. 2d 709 (1956).
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and had lapsed. The trial Judge held that this complaint stated a
cause of action ex contractu and granted defendant's motion to strike
all allegations in the complaint sounding in tort.
On appeal, this was affirmed, the court holding that where a com-
plaint states a cause of action in contract, the nature of the action
as ex contractu is not affected by allegations sounding in tort and such
allegations may be disregarded as surplusage. The court also had the
following to say:
Although there is a broad distinction between causes of action
arising ex contractu and those arising ex delicto, the divid-
ing line between breaches of contract and torts often lies in a
twilight zone, where it is difficult to determine whether the case
applied strictly to the one or to the other. There is no certain
test by which the court can be guided in determining whether a
particular action is ex delicto or ex contractu. The question
must be determined solely from the pleadings with an eye as to
what is the real nature of the grievance.
Raines v. The Life Insurance Company of Virginia8 is a case
that supports the rule, stated above, that where it clearly appears
that an insurance company discontinues the collection of premiums
with the intention of causing the policy to lapse, a verdict for puni-
tive damages will not be disturbed. However, in this case the court
held that the policy lapsed for non-payment of premiums and was
not the result of the insurer's failure to collect the premiums.
Fire Policies
McSweeney v. Utica Fire Insurance Company of Oneida County,
N. y.9 involves an action on two fire insurance policies which was
defended on the grounds "that the fire was brought about by the
illegal acts of the plaintiff herself, acting through her agent or
representative, to wit, arson." The court was held to have properly
excluded the insured's evidence that she had been tried and acquitted
of arson, the court saying that under the South Carolina rule, con-
victions and acquittal in criminal actions are not admissible in civil
actions.
Foster v. Canal Insurance Company o was an action to recover
the face amount of an automobile fire policy. The policy had been
procured by a finance company as a lien holder on the automobile
8. 228 S.C. 601, 91 S.E. 2d 286 (1956).
9. 224 F. 2d 327 (1955).
10. 227 S.C. 322, 88 S.E. 2d 59 (1955).
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involved and the insured had never seen the policy or a copy thereof.
The policy contained a provision whereby no recovery could be had
in cases where the loss occurred outside the fifty mile limitation area.
The insured was an undertaker in the City of Gaffney, S. C., and the
loss occurred in the State of Virginia.
The trial Judge refused to grant defendant's motion for nonsuit
and the verdict was directed for the plaintiff. On appeal this was
reversed and the court ordered judgment to be entered for the de-
fendant, the court saying that the insured could not recover where
the loss occurred outside the fifty mile limitation area even though
the insured was not aware of the provision.
Harwell v. Home Mutual Fire Insurance Company" dealt with a
provision in a policy which provided that, should a loss occur and
the parties not be able to agree on the extent of damage caused there-
by, the extent of damage should be determined by arbitration. The
assured brought suit without resort to this provision and the insur-
ance company requested that the provision be complied with. The
court held that where such a provision is not made a condition pre-
cedent to an action on the policy, compliance therewith is not neces-
sary, but where the policy forbids insured from bringing suit until
after amount of loss has been submitted to arbitration, as in the
instant case, compliance with such provision, if demanded by the
insurer, is a condition precedent to an action on the policy, and con-
sequently held the present action to have been brought prematurely.
Estoppel or Waiver
Matthews v. National Fidelity Insurance Coinpany12 was a case
in which the policy in question was issued contemporaneously with
the insured's becoming a member of a club, and was the last in a
series of five yearly insurance policies issued by the insurer on the
life of the deceased. It appears that while the policy for the previous
year was in force, the deceased filed a claim for benefits thereunder.
This claim had not been paid when the policy expired and the new
one, here in question, was issued. Later, the deceased's agent was
notified that the policy had been cancelled because of non-payment
of premiums. She then contacted the insurer and it was agreed that
the past due premiums would be paid from the proceeds of the claim
filed under the old policy. Thereafter, insurer issued its check
marked payment in full and "in consideration of said payment the
11. 228 S.C. 594, 91 S.E. 2d 273 (1956).
12. 228 S.C. 124, 89 S.E. 2d 95 (1955).
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policy is hereby reinstated". Thereafter, the deceased died and the
beneficiary files this claim for death benefits, the insurer defends by
asserting the lapse of the policy because of non-payment of premium.
The court held the insurer to have waived this defense because
of the wording on the check in payment of the first claim. Since
the first policy had expired, it could not be reinstated and hence the
wording was held to apply to the policy under which the beneficiary
here claims.
Pilot Life Insurance Company v. Pulliam Motor Company18 is
an action by Pilot against the beneficiary of a policy insuring the
life of R. C. Pulliam to cancel the policy on the grounds that Pulliam
fraudulently answered some of the questions on his application for
insurance. Pulliam had been examined by Dr. Spivey, Pilot's medi-
cal examiner, who was also Pulliam's personal physician, and the
doctor submitted the entire medical history to Pilot.
After finding that Pulliam had not fraudulently answered the
questions, the court went on to say that Pilot had waived their
defense because the knowledge of its examiner, Dr. Spivey, was
knowledge to the company, unless Dr. Spivey had fraudulently
withheld information from Pilot, in which case his knowledge could
not be imputed to Pilot. There was no contention that Dr. Spivey
had withheld anything from Pilot. The court states the South Caro-
lina rule that where it is sought to rescind and cancel a policy upon
the grounds of fraud, the insurer must prove all the following five
elements, to wit:
1. The statements complained of must be untrue.
2. Their falsity must have been known to the applicant.
3. They were material to the risk.
4. They were relied on by the insurer.
5. They were made with the intent to deceive and defraud
the company.
Raggio v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society14 holds
that Section 37-161 of the 1952 Code of Laws of South Carolina,
providing that an insurance company, after two years from date
of issuance of a policy of life insurance, is deemed to have waived
right to dispute the truth of representations in application for in-
surance, is applicable as well to fraternal benefit associations, such as
the defendant.
This ruling appears to be in violation of Section 37-857 providing
13. 229 F. 2d 912 (1956).
14. 228 S.C. 340, 90 S.E. 2d 212 (1955).
1956]
5
Walker: Insurance
Published by Scholar Commons, 1956
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTELY
that fraternal benefit associations shall be governed by the provisions
of that chapter and not by the general insurance laws, such as Sec-
tion 37-161, unless express provision therefor is made.
The court, in effect, held that a review of the history of Section
37-161 and the cases concerning it disclosed that the legislature in-
tended fraternal benefit societies to be included within its terms.
Comprehensive Crime Policy
The case of American Mutual Liability Insurance Company v.
Thomas & Howard Company of Columbia, South Carolina'5 was
the only case of significance pertaining to a crime policy. In this
case the insured's employees had stolen over a period of time $17,-
000.00 worth of food stuffs. Insurer defends the action by con-
tending that insured failed to keep a proper record of all property
covered by the policy. The Court of Appeals held that their require-
ment was adequately met by the annual inventory together with the
invoices covering sales and purchases, and although a perpetual in-
ventory would facilitate the determination of the loss, such was not
necessary to fulfill the requirements of the policy.
Disability Benefits
The case of Mallinger v. New York Life Insurance Company
16
was one of this type in which the insurer defended the action by al-
leging that the insured had assumed a gainful occupation. At the
time the insured became disabled, he was engaged in the business of
dismantling buildings, etc. This was in 1932. In 1950 he was given
a job as a policeman and the insurer contends this warrants its dis-
continuance of payments for total disability. The trial judge directed
a verdict for the plaintiff and this was reversed on appeal, the Su-
preme Court holding that whether the insured was totally disabled
from engaging in his former occupation, and whether insured's in-
come as a policeman was comparable to earnings in his former oc-
cupation were for the jury.
"Double Indemnity" Clause
Long v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company'7 was an action to
recover under the "double indemnity" clause. The trial judge direct-
ed a verdict for the defendant upon the ground that the only reasonable
inference to be drawn from the testimony was that the insured had
committed suicide. This was affirmed.
15. 228 F. 2d 550 (1955).
16. 227 S.C. 530, 88 S.E. 2d 578 (1955).
17. 228 S.C. 498, 90 S.E. 2d 915 (1956).
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'he court held that the presumption against suicide was not evi-
dence and does not of itself require submission of the case to the
jury when the only reasonable inference is that the insured took his
own life and that the beneficiary has the burden of proving death
by accidental means in an action on the double indemnity.
Compulsory Insurance
In the case of Dobson v. American Indemnity Company'8 the in-
sured was a common carrier and required by the Public Service
Commission to carry public liability insurance in the amounts of
$5,000.00 for bodily injuries to one person and $1,000.00 for proper-
ty damage. In this instance, however, the insured filed with the
Public Service Commission a policy with limits of $50,000.00 for
bodily injury, and the plaintiff, under the authority of CoDIE o1
LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-702, joined the insurer and
set forth the limits of the policy in his complaint. The lower court
granted defendant's motion to strike from the complaint the allega-
tion of the amount of the policy. This was affirmed on appeal, the
court holding that the amount of the policy in excess of the statu-
tory requirements is in effect private insurance and the existence of
it should not come to the attention of the jury in the trial of the
action.
Certain Provisions of Policies
A clause in an accident and health policy which excluded coverage
of any disability while insured was not continuously under profes-
sional care and regular attendance, at least once in seven days, of a
legally licensed physician or surgeon, other than himself was held to
be plain and unambiguous, and a valid portion of an insurance con-
tract by our ,court in the case of Sample v. Reserve Life Insurance
Company.
19
The case of American Casualty Company of Reading v. Denmark
Foods, Inc.20 involved an endorsement extending coverage to "hired
automobiles". This was an action for a declaratory judgment where-
by the insurer sought to have its rights declared under this endorse-
ment where the insured had been sued for damages resulting from a
collision involving a truck owned and operated by an independent
contractor of the insured. The court held that the insurer was not
liable under the "hired automobiles" endorsement where the vehicle
involved was that of an independent contractor. The court held
18. 227 S.C. 307, 87 S.R. 2d 869 (1955).
19. 227 S.C. 206, 87 S.E. 2d 476 (1955).
20. 224 F. 2d 461 (1955).
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that the parties had contemplated vehicles actually hired or rented
by the insured and operated by it.
The last case to be considered here is one of novel impression in
our State. The case of McAllister v. Motor Insurance Company,2 1
deals with the following provision:
This policy does not apply . . . (b) under any of the coverages,
while the automobile is subject to any bailment lease, conditional
sale, mortgage or other encumbrance not specifically declared
and described in this policy.
The policy set forth the mortgage that was then in existence.
Plaintiff thereafter gave three mortgages on the car in question.
This policy was in force when the car was damaged by fire.
In interpreting this provision, the court held it to have no relation
to the mortgage placed on the car subsequent to the issuance of the
policy. There was no provision made for reporting any subsequent
mortgages and such mortgages could not be known at the time.
The court said that this provision was at best ambiguous and must,
therefore, be resolved in favor of the insured.
21. 227 S.C. 475, 88 S.E. 2d 621 (1955).
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